A Lesson from the South for Fiscal Policy in the US and Other Advanced Countries by Frankel, Jeffrey A.
 
A Lesson from the South for Fiscal Policy in the US and Other
Advanced Countries
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Frankel, Jeffrey A. 2011. A Lesson from the South for Fiscal
Policy in the US and Other Advanced Countries. Comparative
Economic Studies 53(3): 407-430.
Published Version doi:10.1057/ces.2011.7
Accessed February 19, 2015 10:01:32 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8705907
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAASymposium Article
A Lesson from the South for Fiscal Policy
in the US and Other Advanced Countries
JEFFREY FRANKEL
Harvard University, 79 JFK Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
American fiscal policy has been procyclical: Washington wasted the expansion
period 2001–2007 by running budget deficits, but by 2011 had come to feel
constrained by inherited debt to withdraw fiscal stimulus. Chile has achieved
countercyclical fiscal policy – saving in booms and easing in recession – during the
same decade that rich countries forgot how to do so. Chile has a rule that targets a
structural budget balance. But rules are not credible by themselves. In Europe and
the United States, official forecasts are overly optimistic in booms; so revenue is
spent rather than saved. Chile avoids such wishful thinking by having independent
panels of experts decide what is structural and what is cyclical.
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INTRODUCTION
Two decades ago, many people had drawn a lesson from the 1980s: Japan’s
variant of capitalism was the best model. Other countries around the world
should and would follow it. Japan’s admired institutions included relationship
banking, keiretsu, bonus compensation for workers, lifetime employment,
consensus building, strategic trade policy, administrative guidance, pro-saving
policies, and corporate goals of maximizing companies’ industrial capacity or
market share. These features were viewed as elements of Japanese economic
success that were potentially worthy of emulation. The Japanese model quickly
lost its luster in the 1990s, however, when the stock market and real estate
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www.palgrave-journals.com/ces/market crashed, followed by many years of severe stagnation in the real
economy.
1
A decade ago, many thought that the lesson of the 1990s had been that
the United States’ variant of capitalism was the best model, and that other
countries should and would follow. The touted institutions included arms-
length banking, competition for corporate control, Anglo-American securities
markets, reliance on accounting firms and rating agencies, derivatives,
bonus-compensation for executives, an adversarial legal system, deregula-
tion, pro-consumer credit policies, and corporate goals of maximizing
companies’ profits or share price. These features were viewed as elements
of US economic success and potentially worthy of emulation. The American
model quickly lost its attractiveness in the 2000s, however, when the stock
market and real estate market crashed. Poor economic performance left per
capita income and median household income below their levels of 2000 –
even before the severe US-originated recession of 2008–2009.
2
Where should countries look now, for models of economic success to
emulate?
Perhaps they should look to the periphery of the world economy. Some
smaller and less-rich countries have experimented with policies and
institutions that could usefully be adopted by others. Singapore achieved
rich country status with a unique development strategy. Among its many
innovations was a paternalistic approach to saving. Costa Rica in Central
America and Mauritius in Africa are each conspicuous performance standouts
in their respective regions. Among many other decisions that worked out
well, both countries have foregone a standing army. The result in both cases
has been histories with no coups and with financial savings that could be
used for education and other good things. Slovakia and Estonia in Central/
Eastern Europe have simplified their tax systems by means of a flat tax.
3
Some of the lessons from emerging market countries can be useful for
the big advanced countries. Two illustrations from microeconomics: First,
Singapore pioneered the use of the price mechanism to reduce traffic congestion
1The so-called revisionists, led by Johnson (1982), ridiculed economists’ beliefs in free trade
and in the proposition that there could be such a thing as too much investment. The literature began
with Vogel (1979), a book that was ahead of its time, and ended with Fingleton (1995), which was
behind its time. Frankel (1993) surveyed economists’ research on the Japanese financial system as of
the end of the 1980s.
2Frankel (2001) gave the author’s views on the US capitalist model and claims of a ‘New
Economy’ as of the end of the 1990s.
3Examples of influential innovations from small advanced periphery countries: Inflation
Targeting in New Zealand and FDI-friendly tax policy in Ireland. I have pondered the success of
Mauritius in Frankel (2010a).
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ted congestion pricing in 2003; other big cities should do the same. Second,
Mexico pioneered Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT). CCT programs, which
make poverty benefits contingent on children’s school attendance, have been
emulated in many countries, and embraced even in New York City.
4
Some emerging market and developing countries also have lessons for the
United States in areas of macroeconomics, specifically regarding the cyclicality
of fiscal policy. To state the message of this paper most succinctly, over the last
decade countries from Chile to China learned how to run properly counter-
cyclical fiscal policy: taking advantage of boom periods such as 2003–2008 to
achieve high national savings, and in particular to run budget surpluses, which
then allows some fiscal ease in response to downturns such as 2008–2009.
During this same period, advanced countries such as the United States and
United Kingdom forgot how to run countercyclical fiscal policy. Perhaps the
‘leaders’ could look to the ‘followers’ for some tips on how to get back on track.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO DRAW LESSONS FROM THE PERIPHERY?
Before turning to specifics, let us elaborate on the larger theme that advanced
economies could learn some things from developing countries. This line of
argument is not meant as an attack on Western values or modes of thought. It
is not a paean to Confucian values or native folk remedies in the Andes or
Africa. In my view, when Americans lectured others on the virtues of electoral
democracy, the rule of law, and market-based economics, they were right.
Where they were wrong was the arrogance of the lectures, most especially the
failure to see that their own country needed to be on the receiving end just as
much as developing countries.
5
In some cases, American or Western institutions were successfully
transplanted to other countries in the past, and now need to be re-imported.
An analogy. In the latter part of the 19th century the vineyards of France and
other parts of Europe were destroyed by the microscopic aphid Phylloxera
vastatrix. Eventually a desperate last resort was tried: grafting susceptible
4On Conditional Cash Transfer programs, see Rawlings and Rubio (2005) and Fernald et al.
(2008). Outside of the economic area as well, the United States could perhaps usefully emulate some
institutions from southern neighbors. Mexico has constitutional provisions for the resolution of
disputed results in presidential elections without relying on rulings made by appointees of the party
leaders themselves; Henrı ´quez (2006).
5The proposition that fears regarding managerial incentives and crony capitalism were
relevant not just to the financial sector in developing countries but to the United States as well was
put forward before the global financial crisis by Rajan (2005) and after the crisis by Johnson (2009).
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originally been imported from Europe. Purist French vintners initially
disdained what they considered a plan to compromise the refined tastes of
their grape varieties. But it saved the European vineyards, and did not impair
the quality of the wine. The New World had come to the rescue of the Old.
Countries that are small, or far-away, or newly independent, or that are
just emerging from a devastating war, are often more free to experiment, than
is the United States or other large established countries. Not all the experi-
ments will succeed. But some will. The results may include some useful
lessons for others, including for the big guys.
This paper examines the problem of how to make fiscal policy counter-
cyclical. Fiscal policy in the United States, United Kingdom and other advanced
countries became less countercyclical after 2001, as governments wasted the
opportunity of the 2002–2007 expansion period by running large budget deficits.
Meanwhile fiscal policy in Chile became more countercyclical – saving in the
boom and easing in the 2008–2009 recession – during the same decade that rich
countries forgot how to do it. It has achieved countercyclical fiscal policy by
means of some institutions that could usefully be adopted by other countries.
Chile has a rule that targets a structural budget deficit of zero. But rules
are not enough in themselves, as the failures of Europe’s Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) illustrate. In both Europe and United States, budget forecasts that
are systematically overly optimistic are an important part of the problem.
Chile’s key innovation was to vest responsibility for estimating the long-run
trends in budget determinants in panels of independent experts. Other
countries might usefully follow Chile’s lead, and develop independent
institutions that would determine whether a given year’s deficit is structural
or temporary. The alternative is that politicians, inclined to wishful thinking,
forecast that booms will continue indefinitely, with the result that revenue is
spent rather than saved.
The paper begins with a discussion of fiscal policy in the United States
and other advanced countries. It then turns to the poor performance of
institutional structures that are supposed to keep fiscal policy under control.
The core of the paper is the lesson from the periphery – Chile’s institutional
structure.
T H EU SD E B A T EO V E RF I S C A LP O L I C Y
The issue at the top of the policy agenda in the United States and United
Kingdom now is fiscal policy. Whether American fiscal policy gets back on
track will certainly be an important determinant of the country’s economic
performance in years to come.
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conservatives who philosophically believe in strong budgets and small
government, and liberals who do not. In my view this is not the right way
to characterize the debate. Let us waive the commonly made point that
small government is classically supposed to be the aim of ‘liberals’, in the
19th century definition, not ‘conservatives’, and vice versa. My point is very
different: those who call themselves conservatives in practice tend to adopt
policies that are the opposite of fiscal conservatism.
6
In the first place, the right goal should be budgets that allow surpluses in
booms and deficits in recession. In the second place, the correlation between
how loudly an American politician proclaims a belief in fiscal conservatism
and how likely he or she is to take corresponding policy steps is not positive.
I can offer three pieces of evidence to bolster the proposition that
politicians who describe themselves as fiscal conservatives in rhetoric do the
opposite in practice:
(i) The pattern of states whose Senators win pork barrel projects and other
federal spending in their home states: ‘Red states’ tend on average to take
home significantly more federal dollars than ‘blue states’. Figure 1 shows
the correlation between the tendency to vote Republican, shown on the
vertical axis, and the state’s ranking in the federal dollars sweepstakes
shown on the horizontal axis, with the winners to the right.
7
(ii) The pattern of spending under Republican presidents. When Ronald
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush, entered the White House,
not only did budget deficits rise sharply, but the rate of growth of federal
spending rose sharply each time as well, as Figure 2 shows.
8
(iii) The voting pattern among the 258 members of Congress who signed an
unconditional pledge in 2004 not to raise taxes: They voted for greater
increases in spending than those who did not sign the pledge (Gale and
Kelly, 2004).
6I would prefer to call their policies ‘illiberal’ to clarify that their policies are neither liberal in
the 19th century sense nor conservative in the modern sense. This claim applies not just to their
fiscal policies, but also in other economic matters such as monetary policy and trade policy as well
(Frankel, 2003). The same is true with respect to social policy and foreign policy: modern-day
American conservatives in practice favor government intervention and radical departures from past
practice.
7New Jersey is the state that takes the least money home in the rankings, New Mexico
the most.
8The correlation between budget deficits and spending is positive (0.86). The data reject the
Starve the Beast Hypothesis (the claim that tax-cut-induced budget deficits such as those of the
1980s and 2000s put downward pressure on spending). The data instead support the Shared
Sacrifice hypothesis (budget deficits can be eliminated under a regime that constrains both on the
tax and spending sides, as in the 1990s).
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conservatives – and probably themselves as well – able to enact tax and
spending policies that produce large budget deficits? They do so by means of
overly optimistic predictions. Often they make overly optimistic assumptions
Figure 1: States ranked by federal spending received per tax dollar paid in 2005 versus party vote ratio in
recent elections
Data sources: The Tax Foundation and Atlas of US Presidential Elections
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Figure 2: The Shared Sacrifice approach (1990s) succeeded in eliminating budget deficits, but the Starve
the Beast approach failed (1980s) and (2000s)
Note: Spending/GDP (upper line) corresponds to scale on left; budget balance/GDP (lower line)
corresponds to scale on right.
Source: Frankel (2008)
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variables.
9 They also often make overly optimistic assumptions about the
boost to growth rates and tax revenues that their policies will yield. Finally,
they sometimes deliberately manipulate the timing of legislation so as to mis-
represent their plans.
For example, when the Bush administration took office in January 2001,
it forecast that the budget surplus it inherited would not only continue
but would rise in the future, and would cumulate to $5 trillion over the
coming decade in round numbers. As the actual budget numbers came in, it
was forced to revise downward its near-term forecasts every six months, as
Figure 3 shows. Even after a recession began in March 2001, the Admini-
stration continued to forecast surpluses. Even after the actual balance turned
negative in 2002, it predicted that the deficits would soon disappear and turn
back into rising surpluses. Throughout President Bush’s eight years in office,
the official forecasts never stopped showing surpluses after 2011.
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Figure 3: Official US forecasts for 2002, 2003, and 2004 budget surpluses, as revised every 6 months
Source: US Office of Management and Budget
9This stratagem in the Reagan White House was anthropomorphized under the name Ms. Rosy
Scenario. Stockman (1986) and Feldstein (1994, pp. 50, 53).
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sequent reality? In three sorts of ways. The first comes in the form of baseline
macroeconomic assumptions. Making overly optimistic forecasts of GDP is of
course an old trick. A more subtle component of the over-optimistic forecasts of
2001 (small, but revealing): An incoming political appointee at the Office of
Management and Budget decided to raise an obscure parameter estimate, the
share of labor income in GDP, from the existing technocratic professional
estimate. Because labor income is taxed at higher rates than capital income, the
change had the effect of artificially raising the forecast for future tax revenue.
More importantly, Bush Administration officials argued publically that
their tax cuts were consistent with fiscal discipline by appealing to two
fanciful theories: the Laffer Proposition, which says that cuts in tax rates will
pay for themselves via higher economic activity, and the Starve the Beast
Hypothesis, which says that tax cuts will increase the budget deficit and put
downward pressure on federal spending. It is insufficiently remarked that the
two propositions are inconsistent with each other: reductions in tax rates
can’t increase tax revenues and reduce tax revenues at the same time. But
being mutually exclusive does not prevent them both from being wrong.
The Laffer Proposition, while theoretically possible under certain condi-
tions, does not apply to the US income tax rate: a cut in those rates reduces
revenue, precisely as common sense would indicate. This was the outcome
of the Bush tax cuts of 2001–2003, as well as a similar big experiment earlier:
the Reagan tax cuts of 1981–1983. Both episodes contributed to record US
budget deficits. Rejection of the Laffer Proposition is also the conclusion of
more systematic scholarly studies, which rely on more than two data points
and try to control for other factors that may be changing at the same time.
Getting more major data points requires going further back in history, or
including the experience of other countries, or both.
10 Finally, a heavy
majority of professional economists reject the Proposition, including such
illustrious economic advisers to Presidents Reagan and Bush II as Martin
Feldstein, Glenn Hubbard, and Greg Mankiw. So thorough is the discrediting
of the Laffer Hypothesis, that some deny that these two presidents or their top
officials could have ever believed such a thing. But abundant quotes suggest
that they did.
11
The Starve the Beast Hypothesis claims that politicians cannot spend
money that they don’t have. In theory, Congressmen are supposedly inhibited
10 Goolsbee (1999) analyzes six different U.S. tax changes since 1922. Trabandt and Uhlig
(2010) use international evidence to examine the shape of the Laffer curve. Heijman and van Ophem
(2005) try also to account for rising tax rates driving economic activities ‘underground’.
11 Further evidence and references on the Laffer Proposition are given in Frankel (2008).
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will mean higher taxes for their grandchildren. The theory fails on both
conceptual grounds and empirical grounds. Conceptually, one should begin
by asking: what is the alternative fiscal regime to which Starve the Beast
is being compared? The natural alternative is the regime that was in place
during the 1990s, which I call Shared Sacrifice. During that time, any
congressman wishing to increase spending had to show how he or she would
raise taxes to pay for it. Logically, a Congressman contemplating a new
spending program to benefit some favored supporters will be more inhibited
by fears of other constituents complaining about an immediate tax increase
(under the regime of Shared Sacrifice) than by fears of constituents com-
plaining that budget deficits might mean higher taxes many years into the
future (under Starve the Beast). Sure enough, the Shared Sacrifice approach
of the 1990s succeeded in eliminating budget deficits, and did so to a sub-
stantial degree by cutting the growth of spending. Compare this outcome
to the sharp increases in spending that took place when President Reagan
took office, when the first President Bush took office, and when the second
President Bush took office (Figure 2).
12
As with the Laffer Hypothesis, more systematic econometric analysis
confirms the rejection of the Starve the Beast Hypothesis. This is the finding
of unbiased researchers, whether they are true libertarians (traditional fiscal
conservatives) who would prefer to shrink government spending, such as
William Niskanen (2002, 2004, 2006), President of the Cato Institute and
formerly Member of Ronald Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers or others
who might be characterized as of a more liberal bent politically (Gale and
Orszag, 2004; and Romer and Romer, 2007).
Overoptimistic macroeconomic assumptions worked in the context of
OMB forecasts, and the Laffer and Starve the Beast Hypotheses each gained
some traction in the court of public opinion. But to get optimistic fiscal
forecasts out of the Congressional Budget Office some more extreme tricks
were required, as the independent agency declined to succumb to the Laffer
12Evidence and references on the Starve the Beast Hypothesis are given in Frankel (2008). The
periods of the Starve the Beast regime versus the Shared Sacrifice regime do not correspond perfectly
to the periods of Republican versus Democratic presidents, respectively. They correspond better to
decades. The first two years of George H.W. Bush’s presidency, 1989–1990, were a continuation of
Reagan’s policies fiscally (the infamous ‘no new taxes’ pledge). But the first President Bush deserves
credit for reversing course in 1990 and negotiating with congressional Democrats the beginning
of the Shared Sacrifice regime (including spending caps and the Pay As You Go rules, which were
not allowed to lapse until 2001). Conversely, the first two years of Barack Obama’s presidency,
2009–2010, were arguably a continuation of the second Bush’s fiscal policies (eg, congressional
Republicans insisted that all the Bush tax cuts be extended past their 2010 sunset dates).
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to congressional demands that it consider ‘dynamic scoring’ of tax cuts.
13
To understand the tricks, begin with the requirement that CBO’s baseline
forecasts must take their tax and spending assumptions from current law. The
Bush Administration exploited this by excising from current law expensive
policies that they had every intention of pursuing in the future, often explicitly
so. Four examples: the continuation of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (which
were always paid for with ‘supplemental’ budget requests when the time came,
as if they were an unpredictable surprise); annual revocation of purported cuts
in payments to doctors that would have driven them out of Medicare if ever
allowed to go into effect; annual patches for the Alternative Minimum Tax
(which otherwise threatened to expose millions of middle class families to taxes
that had never been intended to apply to them); and the intended extension in
2011 of the income tax cuts and estate tax abolition that were legislated in 2001
and 2003 with a phony sunset provision for 2010. All four are examples of
expensive policy measures that the Administration fully intended would take
place, but that they excluded from legislation so that the official forecasts would
misleadingly appear to show smaller deficits and a return to surplus after 2010.
Unrealistic macroeconomic assumptions, fanciful behavioral theories,
and legislation that deliberately misrepresents policy plans were all crude
ways to get overly optimistic forecasts. But they were not too crude to fool
much of the public. Politicians were able to continue posing as fiscal
conservatives while enacting tax and spending policies that implied ever-
widening budget deficits.
Let us summarize the conclusion of the section. The fiscal mess that the
United States finds itself in is to some extent attributable to a pattern in recent
decades of overly optimistic budget forecasts by government officials. To
justify running large budget deficits, even in periods of strong income, they
have often unrealistically forecast that the budget deficits will go away in the
future. But how is it done in other parts of the world?
A HISTORIC SHIFT IN FISCAL POLICIES AMONG SOME COUNTRIES IN THE
SOUTH
In the past, a heavy majority of developing countries showed a pattern
of fiscal policy that was procyclical or – to use a blunter word –
13Under Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin, the CBO in 2003 estimated dynamic scoring, but
did not find that tax cuts came anywhere near paying for themselves. For details see Frankel (2008,
pp. 12–14).
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14 This was especially true of countries that exported oil,
minerals, and agricultural commodities, and particularly countries in Latin
America (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Caldero ´n and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003; Perry
2003). When world commodity markets boomed and governments should
have saved the higher tax revenue, they would instead spend more,
sometimes because they mistakenly thought that the boom would last
indefinitely. When commodity prices turned back down, the country would
be forced to cut spending, thereby exacerbating the downturn.
Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2005) studied procyclicality for 104
countries over the period 1960–2003. Figure 4, taken from their study, shows
for each country the correlation between real government spending and
output, both of them cyclically adjusted. Almost every developing country,
represented by the light bars, shows a positive correlation, approaching +1
in the case of Oman. This indicates procyclical fiscal policy. Almost every
advanced country, represented by the black bars, shows a negative correla-
tion, approaching 1 in the case of Finland. This indicates countercyclical
Figure 4: Cyclical correlations between government spending and GDP through 2003
Notes: Dark bars are OECD countries and light ones are non-OECD countries. The cyclical components of
both variables were estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. Real government expenditure is defined
as Central Government expenditure deflated by the GDP deflator. A positive correlation indicates
procyclical fiscal policy.
Data Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF
Source: Kaminsky et al (2005)
14Procyclical fiscal policy among developing countries has been studied by Tornell and Lane
(1999), Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2005), Talvi and Vegh (2005), Alesina et al. (2008), Mendoza
and Oviedo (2006), Ilzetski and Vegh (2008) and Medas and Zakharova (2009).
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up with negative correlation coefficients that place them among the half-
dozen most countercyclical countries.
Over the last decade – and perhaps in reaction to the emerging market
crises of the late 1990s – some emerging market countries have moved in
the direction of countercyclical or stabilizing fiscal policies. They took advan-
tage of the boom years 2003–2007 to run primary budget surpluses. They
reduced their debts, in many cases, to levels lower than the United States and
other OECD countries. By 2007, on the eve of the global financial crisis, Latin
America and the Caribbean had reduced its debt to 33% of GDP, as compared to
63% in the United States. Debt levels among the top 20 rich countries (debt/
GDP ratios around 80%) are now twice those of the top 20 emerging markets.
Some emerging markets – pronounced ‘debt intolerant’ not long ago – have
earned credit ratings higher than some so-called advanced countries. Korea now
has a better credit rating that Portugal. Not only Chile, but also Malaysia,
Mexico, Poland and South Africa, now have higher credit ratings than Greece or
I c e l a n d .C h i n ab y2 0 1 1h a da c h i e v e dac r e d i tr a t i n ga ss t r o n ga sJ a p a n ’ s .
A stronger fiscal position is one of the reasons that countries such as China
could afford to undertake large and sustained fiscal stimulus in response to
the 2008–2009 global recession. Other big emerging markets such as Brazil
and Indonesia also found themselves freed of the need to cut spending
in a recession, and were better able to sail through than the industrialized
countries. The United States and United Kingdom, by contrast, had wasted the
preceding expansion running budget deficits, and hence by 2010 had come
to feel heavily constrained by their debts. As of the date of writing, fiscal
consolidation is the political priority in both countries, notwithstanding that
output is still well below most measures of potential output.
WHAT SORT OF INSTITUTIONS CAN INSULATE GOVERNMENTS AGAINST
POLITICAL PRESSURES TO OVERSPEND IN BOOMS?
The advice to save in a boom is standard. One would like to be able to do
more than cite historical examples of governments that have had the courage
to take away the fiscal punch bowl. One would like an example of an
innovation designed to deliver countercyclical fiscal policy, an institution that
might serve as a template for other countries, a model that can help even in
times and places where the political forces to follow procyclical fiscal policy
would otherwise be too strong to resist.
The institutions that first come to mind are budget rules, such as the SGP
that supposedly constrains fiscal policy among euro members or the Balanced
J Frankel
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But the SGP and other such rules have failed miserably, as the sovereign debt
troubles in Greece and others on the European periphery had made clear for
all to see by 2010. At no point have the SGP’s limits on budget deficits and
debt levels been credible.
The problems with a simple deficit ceiling rule such as the SGP are well
known. If governments are not allowed to run larger budget deficits in
recessions than in other times, the recessions will be exacerbated. Indeed, the
damage in that circumstance is sufficiently great that it is not politically
credible that the country will stick with the rule in the first place.
15
The alternative is a structural budget rule, one that requires the govern-
ment to balance the budget on a cyclically adjusted basis. The rule dictates
that in a boom spending can be increased, or taxes cut, only to the extent that
the growth and therefore surging revenues are deemed permanent. To the
extent that the boom is temporary, the revenue should be saved via budget
surpluses. This requires forecasts of the short-term and long-term paths of
key economic variables. When the economy is expanding, the computation of
the structural budget requires an estimate of the extent to which the boom is
permanent or temporary. When the economy is in recession, the computation
requires an estimate of whether it will recover quickly.
A problem with most budget rules is that such estimation is made by
government agencies that are subject to the usual pressures of the political
process. Given the genuine uncertainty that surrounds any such estimates,
the political pressures need not necessarily be intense for the result to be
overly optimistic forecasts of economic growth and revenues. Those forecasts
in turn are an excuse for over-spending in the boom.
Research has found econometric support for a series of eight hypotheses
regarding forecasts by the official agencies that have responsibility for
formulating the budget. The statistical evidence suggests that the overly
optimistic US budget forecasts of 2001–2008 were not an isolated episode, but
were rather part of a larger historical pattern. Taken together, these seven
hypotheses suggest that countries could make their fiscal policies more
countercyclical if they adopted institutional arrangements to protect budget
forecasting from political pressures, arrangements such as those adopted by
Chile over the past decade.
16
(1) Official forecasts of budgets and GDP are overly optimistic on average.F o r
the United States, McNees (1995) and Auerbach (1994) found an optimistic
15For this reason, stricter rules in some cases are less credible. Neut and Velasco (2003).
16Frankel (2011) gives further details on the empirical results reported here, the Chilean
system, and the literature.
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OMB to overestimate revenues during the period 1986–1993, but found a
tendency to underestimate revenues during the period 1993–1999 (during
the Clinton Administration). Frendreis and Tatalovich (2000) and McNab
et al. (2007) also find bias in OMB forecasts, which they attribute to political
influences. Forni and Momigliano (2004) find optimism bias among OECD
countries more generally. Ashiya (2007) finds that official Japanese growth
forecasts at a 16-month horizon are biased upwards. Jonung and Larch
(2006) find a clear tendency for EU governments, when making budget
plans, to overestimate the economic growth rate. Most of these authors
argue that the systematic over-optimism in ex ante forecasts translates
directly into larger ex post deficits.
(2) The bias toward over-optimism is greater in booms, and increases with the horizon
of the forecasts. Apparently government policymakers are subject to wish-
ful thinking, so that each boom is judged to be permanent.
17 Table 1a and b
Table 1: GDP growth error in official forecast, in 33 countries: (a) effect of GDP gap; (b) effect of absolute
GDP gap
Variables (1) (2) (3)
One year ahead Two years ahead Three years ahead
(a)
GDP
a 0.204*** 0.497*** 0.660***
(0.033) (0.078) (0.153)
Constant 0.265*** 0.799*** 1.438***
(0.091) (0.130) (0.210)
Observations 368 282 175
R
2 0.138 0.298 0.303
RMSE 2.234 2.945 3.397
(b)
Absolute GDP
b 0.133 0.531*** 0.743***
(0.106) (0.114) (0.233)
Constant -0.019 -0.255 0.133
(0.242) (0.314) (0.491)
Observations 368 282 175
R
2 0.035 0.201 0.220
RMSE 2.363 3.142 3.594
aGDP is measured as deviation from a quadratic trend, and lagged so that it lines up with the year in
which the forecast was made.
bAbsolute GDP is the absolute value of the GDP deviation.
*po0.1, **po0.05, ***po0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country.
17This pattern is captured by the slogan ‘this time is different’ highlighted by Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009).
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Comparative Economic Studiesreport the results of regressions to explain official errors in forecasting
the GDP growth rate, for a sample of 33 countries.
18 Tables 2a and b report
analogous results to explain official errors in forecasting the budget surplus.
The constant term is always highly significant, confirming that forecasts are
overly optimistic on average.
(3) The bias may be present at both ends of the business cycle. In Tables 1a and
2a the coefficient on GDP at the time of the forecast (relative to a long-term
quadratic trend) is always highly significant, showing that over-optimism is
greater at the height of the business cycle. The unconditional and condi-
tional biases both increase substantially as one moves from the one-year
horizon to the three-year horizon. In Tables 1b and 2b the coefficient on the
absolute value of the GDP gap is also highly significant (at the two- and
three-year horizons), indicating that the bias may be associated with
Table 2: Budget balance error in official forecast as % of GDP, in 33 countries: (a) effect of GDP gap;
(b) effect of absolute GDP gap
Variables (1) (2) (3)
One year ahead Two years ahead Three years ahead
(a)
GDP
a 0.093*** 0.258*** 0.289***
(0.019) (0.040) (0.063)
Constant 0.201 0.649*** 1.364***
(0.197) (0.231) (0.348)
Observations 398 300 179
R
2 0.033 0.113 0.092
RMSE 2.248 2.732 3.095
(b)
Absolute GDP
b 0.056 0.245*** 0.325***
(0.069) (0.064) (0.113)
Constant 0.069 0.180 0.780**
(0.157) (0.237) (0.319)
Observations 398 300 179
R
2 0.007 0.060 0.066
RMSE 2.277 2.814 3.139
aGDP is measured as deviation from a quadratic trend, and lagged so that it lines up with the year in
which the forecast was made.
bAbsolute GDP is the absolute value of the GDP deviation.
*po0.1, **po0.05, ***po0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country.
18The data are drawn from 1985 to 2009, although some of the 33 countries are missing data
for the early years. Most countries do not make available a time series of official budget forecasts.
For details see Frankel (2011), particularly the Data Appendix. Estimation results with fixed effects
are available in a subsequent paper.
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Comparative Economic Studiesperiods of unusually low GDP as well as unusually high GDP. A plausible
interpretation is that genuine uncertainty is high both at the top of the
business cycle and at the bottom, so that there is more scope for wishful
thinking.
(4) The bias is greater among those European governments that are politically
subject to the budget rules in the SGP because they have joined the euro.
Authors have found a statistically significant optimism bias for some parti-
cular euro members: France, Italy and Portugal over the period 1991–2002
(Hallerberg et al., 2009), and Germany, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, and
Portugal when the data set is updated to 2004 (Von Hagen et al., 2009).
Bru ¨ck and Stephan (2006) explicitly conclude that Eurozone governments
have manipulated deficit forecasts before elections since the introduction of
the SGP. Similarly, Beetsma et al. (2009) find that ex post budget balances
among SGP countries systematically fall short of official ex ante plans.
Marinheiro (2010) adds another complete business cycle to the data under
the SGP, and again finds that the forecasts of European fiscal authorities are
overly optimistic on average. This evidence is not consistently strong across
the set of 15 EU countries, but the bias is again high for the euro countries
France, Italy, and Portugal at all forecast horizons.
We return to our data set of 33 countries and add a dummy for members of
the SGP. Table 3 seeks to explain errors in official forecasts of the growth
rate and Table 4 seeks to explain errors in official forecasts of the budget
deficit. Countries that are nominally under the budget rules of the SGP are
Table 3: Budget balance error in official forecast as % of GDP – effect of SGP rules, in 33 countries
Variables (1) (2) (3)
One year ahead Two years ahead Three years ahead
SGP dummy
a 0.407 0.276 0.0219
(0.355) (0.438) (0.515)
SGPGDP
b 0.189** 0.497*** 0.551***
(0.083) (0.107) (0.132)
Constant 0.033 0.466* 1.214***
(0.229) (0.249) (0.436)
Observations 398 300 179
R
2 0.030 0.080 0.076
RMSE 2.254 2.788 3.132
aSGP is a dummy for countries that are members of the euro and thus subject to the budget rules of the
Stability and Growth Pact.
bGDP is measured as deviation from a quadratic trend and lagged so as to line up with the year in which
the forecast was made.
*po0.1, **po0.05, ***po0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Comparative Economic Studiesprone to more upward bias in their forecasts than other countries, the bias is
concentrated in boom years, and the bias is again worse at the longer-term
horizons than at the one-year horizon.
19
Thus official forecasts, if not insulated from politics, tend to be overly
optimistic in booms, and the problem can be worse when the government is
formally subject to a budget rule. Chile’s structural budget institutions offer
a possible solution to this problem. Since 2000, fiscal policy in Chile has
been governed by a structural budget rule that has succeeded in imple-
menting countercyclical fiscal policy. This accomplishment is all the more
noteworthy in that Latin American countries dependent on commodity
exports have historically experienced fiscal policies that were highly pro-
cyclical. During the 2003–2008 boom, the result was a substantial increase
in national savings, some of it dedicated to funding of pension-related
liabilities of the government. The key innovation is that the responsibility
for estimating the extent to which contemporaneous copper prices and
GDP have departed from their long-run averages is given to panels of inde-
pendent experts and thus insulated from the political process.
Further findings:
(5) In most countries, the real growth rate is the key macroeconomic input for
budget forecasting. Table 5 shows, for a sample of 33 countries, the highly
Table 4: GDP growth rate error in official forecast – effect of SGP rules, in 33 countries
Variables One year ahead Two years ahead Three years ahead
SGP dummy
a 0.179 0.028 1.189*
(0.222) (0.374) (0.674)
SGPGDP
b 0.136* 0.467*** 0.477***
(0.067) (0.125) (0.133)
Constant 0.239 0.876*** 2.207***
(0.168) (0.251) (0.625)
Observations 368 282 175
R
2 0.011 0.043 0.040
RMSE 2.395 3.444 3.998
aSGP is a dummy for countries that are members of the euro and thus subject to the budget rules of the
Stability and Growth Pact.
bGDP is measured as deviation from a quadratic trend and lagged so as to line up with the year in which
the forecast was made.
*po0.1, **po0.05, ***po0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
19The SGP dummy when entered without the GDP interactive term is usually positive and
often significant, especially when estimated with fixed effects (reported in first three columns of the
two tables in the working paper).
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Comparative Economic Studiessignificant relationship between growth and the budget surplus. For every
1 per cent of growth, relative to what was forecast previously, the budget
improves by about half that amount, relative to what was forecast
previously.
(6) In Chile the price of copper is the most important single macroeconomic input
for forecasting the budget. Table 6 reports for Chile the regression of short-
term determination of the budget, analogous to the preceding table, but with
the addition of the copper price. (Again both variables are expressed relative
to the attempt to forecast them earlier.)T h ec o p p e rp r i c ed o m i n a t e sG D Pi n
budget forecasting. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship graphically.
Table 5: GDP growth as a short-term determinant of budget balance in 33 countries
Variables (1) (2) (3)
One year ahead Two years ahead Three years ahead
GDP error 0.490*** 0.512*** 0.455***
(0.053) (0.069) (0.079)
Constant 0.102 0.271 0.724**
(0.172) (0.247) (0.346)
Observations 367 277 175
R
2 0.280 0.369 0.322
RMSE 1.897 2.365 2.690
Dependent variable is budget surplus as a share of GDP, expressed relative to earlier forecast.
Independent variable is GDP expressed relative to earlier forecast at same horizon. Details in Frankel
(2011).
Table 6: Short-term determinants of Chile’s budget deficit
Regression of budget balance (ex post budget relative to forecast) against macroeconomic variables
(ex post relative to forecast). 1990–2009 (20 observations)
Variables Coefficient estimates
Copper price movement
a 0.060** 0.056**
(0.021) (0.021)
GDP movement 0.239
(0.187)
Constant 0.023 0.163
(0.754) (0.683)
R
2 0.299 0.251
RMSE 2.655 2.666
aThe copper price movement is here measured as [log(average of end of month price, Jan.– Dec., of the
next year) – log(August 15-month forward price)]100.
*po0.1, **po0.05, ***po0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Comparative Economic Studies(7) Real copper prices on average revert gradually back to a long-run trend. This is
not always readily perceived, however. For one thing, 30 years of experience is
not enough to discern the pattern; one needs a century or two of data. For
another thing, forecasts are more uncertain in booms, as judged by option-
implied volatility. Thus it is easy to see how government officials could mista-
kenly extrapolate commodity price upswings and, in light of the preceding
finding, how this would in turn lead to overly optimistic budget forecasts.
(8) Unlike in other countries, Chile’s official forecasts are not overly optimistic
on average. Figure 6 plots budget forecast errors across countries and across
time. The horizontal axis is the output gap at the time of the forecast. Other
countries frequently overestimate their budget surplus, especially when
output is high. (A majority of the dots lie above the horizontal line that
represents zero error in forecasting the budget, especially toward the right.).
But Chile rarely does so. (Most of the ‘X’s fall below the horizontal line.)
Chile’s fiscal institutions have apparently enabled it to avoid the problem of
official forecasts that unrealistically extrapolate in boom times.
Chile’s fiscal institutions could usefully be emulated everywhere, most
obviously in other commodity-exporting countries, but in industrialized
countries as well.
20
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Figure 5: Short-term influence of copper price movements on Chile’s budget
20Frankel (2011) explains and analyzes Chile’s structural budget institutions in more detail,
and gives further references.
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Comparative Economic StudiesCOUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL INSTITUTIONS GENERALIZED FOR OTHER
COUNTRIES
Any country could usefully apply variants of the Chilean fiscal device, not just
producers of minerals. Even large diversified industrialized countries could
set up independent institutions charged by law with estimating the output gap
and such other budget-relevant macroeconomic variables as the inflation rate
and the fractions of GDP going to wage versus non-wage income. In some
countries, a useful reinforcement of the Chilean idea would be to formalize
the details of the procedure into law and give the panels legal independence.
There could be laws protecting them from being fired, as there are for gover-
nors of independent central banks. The principle of a separation of decision-
making powers should be retained: the rules as interpreted by the panels
determine the total amount of spending or budget deficits, while the elected
political leaders determine how that total is allocated.
There remain two technical questions: how much of the structural budget
calculations are to be delegated to the independent panels of experts, and
whether the budget rules are interpreted as ex ante or ex post. The procedures
that compute the structural balance in Chile involve a number of calculations
Figure 6: Chile’s official budget forecasts are not prone to the optimism bias of other countries annual
data, 1985–2010, 33 countries. Data sources and other details in Frankel (2011)
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Comparative Economic Studiesthat are in fact made inside the Ministry of Finance, rather than by the panels
of experts. One could imagine moving the locus of these calculations from the
Ministry to the independent panels. This might require a standing bureau-
cracy, in the manner of the US Congressional Budget Office. If the inde-
pendent agency were given more comprehensive control over fiscal policy, it
would then approach symmetry with the delegation of monetary policy to
independent central banks.
21 But few reformers suggest that the details of tax
and spending policy could or should be delegated to an agency that is not
directly accountable in a democratic way.
The second, related, question is whether the targeting is to be ex ante
or ex post.A nex post rule for the budget deficits would have to be phrased
as a target range, or as an upper bound, because unanticipated economic
developments make it impossible for anyone to hit a budget target precisely.
The alternative is for the rule to be interpreted as ex ante: tax rates, spending
parameters and so forth are set so as to produce the desired target if all goes
precisely as expected, while recognizing that there will be unanticipated
deviations during the course of the year.
The analogous issue is familiar in the context of monetary policy. If the
target variable is the money supply or inflation rate, the authorities cannot be
expected to hit it exactly, as opposed to the regime when the target is the price
of gold or the exchange rate. The usual approach is that the monetary
authorities announce a target range for M1 or the inflation rate. Conceptually, a
sincere central bank will set the range so that it can achieve an outcome within
the specified range, say 95% of the time. The public can then monitor the
ability of the central bank to deliver on its commitment. An alternative pro-
posal is that the monetary authorities set the parameters so as to hit a desired
ex ante inflation target. If the one true model of how the economy operates
were known to the central bank, which in turn announced it to the public, the
two procedures would be equivalent. In reality however, the model is highly
uncertain, everyone knows that it is uncertain, and different elements among
the staff and different members of the monetary policy committee vary as to
their preferred models. Thus it is less practical to announce an ex ante target.
The members of the monetary policy committee would have to negotiate with
each other an ever-changing common model and set of forecasts, a cumber-
some way to go about negotiating a decision on monetary policy.
In the case of the fiscal expert panels, however, setting an ex ante target
may be more feasible. More precisely, the panel could be charged with
21 Wyplosz (2005) and Jonung and Larch (2006) have proposed setting up an independent
Fiscal Policy Committee that would reproduce what independent Monetary Policy Committees do.
Others noting the analogy with monetary policy include Alesina and Perotti (1996).
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Comparative Economic Studiesevaluating whether the government’s budget proposal would hit the desired
budget target, not only if output were at potential and the copper price were
at its long-run equilibrium, which they already have to do in Chile, but also,
more comprehensively, if growth and other economic outcomes were at their
expected levels.
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